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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
dudes equitable remedies, and the writ must be dismissed where an ade-
quate ordinary remedy through -injunction exists 8
Injunctive relief will not be entertained49 where an aggrieved party
has a statutory appeal available to him.5"
MAURICE S. CULP
AGENCY
As in past years, the bulk of the cases in the agency area concern real
estate brokers, and the majority of cases in the tort, or master-servant
field, come from the trucking and construction industries. Most of the
cases involved familiar rules of substantive law' or the application of
rules of evidence or procedure,2 and are mentioned in the footnotes be-
low. Only four cases are worthy of additional comment.
Master and Servant
In Travelers Fire Insurance v. Freeman,8 the defendant corporation
kept five automobiles for business use. The corporate master had no
garage facilities for overnight storage and the only street parking facilities
were adjacent to the plant in an undesirable neighborhood. To avoid
the expense of using a public garage, and to avoid the risk of having the
cars stripped while parked on the street, the employer made a regular
practice of having the cars taken home for the night by the salesmen-
drivers, who kept them in their own garages. The accident happened
while a driver was driving to work in the morning. The court of ap-
peals reversed a decision of the trial court and held that as a matter of
law, the driver was not in the course of his employment. The dissenting
opinion admitted that in this case the motive of the driver was probably
personal, i.e., to get a car for his use during the evening, but pointed out
that from the viewpoint of the employer, the primary purpose of the trip
was to benefit the master and the benefit to the employee was incidental
The case of Smith v. Mass. Bonding Co.4 also raises the question of
control over the servant's activities, but here the question was which of
two masters had control and was therefore liable under respondeat su-
" State v. Rockwell, 167 Ohio St. 15, 145 N.E.2d 665 (1957).
" Shaner v. Bahns, 141 N.E.2d 303 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
'The petition sought an injunction against the county commissioners and the county
engineer from taking further action concerning the removal of an advertising sign
from the plaintiff's property. OHIO REV. CODE, § 307.56, authorizes an appeal to
the common pleas court by any person aggrieved by a decision of the board of county
commissioners.
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perior. An independent contractor leased a tractor and driver to a truck
carrier who used the tractor and driver to haul a trailer under the carrier's
I.C.C. permit. If the accident had happened while on the direct route,
it is dear that both the independent contractor and the carrier would be
liable for the driver's negligence. 5 In this case, the tractor broke down,
and, acting under the instructions of the independent contractor, the'
driver parked the trailer and drove back to the contractor's garage for
repairs. The accident happened on the way to the garage, and the victim
of the driver's negligence recovered from the independent contractor.
The contractor sued both his liability insurer and the liability insurer of
the carrier. The court held that the carrier's insurance company was not
liable, as the tractor owner had temporarily re-asserted control, and, there-
fore, the carrier would not have been liable to the injured party. It
would seem that the answer ought to be the same even if the accident
had happened on the direct route and even if the carrier were liable to
the injured person. The carrier is liable to the injured person, not be-
cause he has control, but because of a legislative policy which forbids
a permit-holding carrier to sub-contract an essential part of its operations
in an area where torts are common. But control is still exercised by the
independent contractor, and as between the contractor and the carrier,
primary liability ought to rest on the former.6
'Substantive Law: Bauman v. Worley, 166 Ohio St. 471, 143 N.E. 2d 820 (1957)
(real estate broker as procuring cause of sale-effect of later sale at lower price);
Falls v. Kamping, 144 N.E. 2d 894 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (broker can't recover
commission unless licensed and burden is on his principal to prove he was not li-
censed); Wolf v. Hyman, 143 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (real estate sales-
man not entitled to commission on sale effected after his authority from broker ter-
minated); Kelly v. Ford Motor Company, 139 N.E. 2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957)
(land owner did not reserve control over operations of subcontractors so as to be
liable for injuries sustained by employee); Logsdon v. Main-Nottingham Invest-
ment Company, 141 N.E. 2d 216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (application of apparent
authority doctrine); Hinsche v. Alter, 145 N.E. 2d 368 (Ohio C.P. 1957) (hospitals
are not immune from liability for torts of servants, but churches are); Curry v. Big
Bear Store Co., 142 N.E. 2d 684 (Ohio C.P. 1956) (master liable for defamation
of servant, but not liable for punitive damages absent express authorization or rati-
fication); American Transit Lines v. Smith, 246 F. 2d 86 (6th Cir. 1957) (applying
Ohio law, court held truck carrier liable for tort of driver of leased truck, where trip
finished but carrier had first call on driver's subsequent service).
'Procedure: Arnold v. Grimmeissen, 143 N.E. 2d 615 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (out
of court statements of servant are not admissible to prove he acted in course of em-
ployment); Tipton v. Fleet Maintenance Co., 142 N.E. 2d 882 (Ohio C.P. 1957)
(substituted service could be made on non-resident defendant who did not own or
operate truck, where truck was operated in Ohio by a servant of defendant).
'145 N.E. 2d 217 (Ohio Cr. App. 1957).
142 N.E. 2d 307 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
'Duncan v. Evans, 134 Ohio St. 486, 17 N.E. 2d 913 (1938).
"Globe Indemnity Co. v. Schmitt, 142 Ohio St. 595, 53 N.E. 2d 790 (1944).
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Authority of Agent
There is some confusion in the cases as to the authority of one spouse
to act for another. It seems clear that no agency arises from the fact of
marriage alone, except for the "agency of necessity" concept found in sec-
tion 3103.03 of the Ohio Revised Code, which properly speaking is not
agency at all, but a substantive rule of domestic relations law. It is also
apparent that various forms of implied and apparent authority will arise
from the fact of a normal marriage, and the tendency in recent years has
been to shift the burden of proof in this situation and presume that each
spouse is the agent of the other in the purchase of household supplies.
A recent court of appeals case is a good illustration of this broad author-
ity. The wife owned a lot and built the family home on it. The negoti-
ations for the building permit were carried on by the husband, apparently
with the knowledge of the wife. The court held that she was bound by
the agreement of the husband that certain architectural standards would
be complied withT
Liability of the Agent on the Contract
A recent case raises the difficult question of the liability of an agent
on a written contract. The basic rule of interpretation is to look at the
body of the contract to determine whether or not the agent is adding his
personal liability to that of the principal Where the body of the instru-
ment contains no such indication, as is the case with the typical nego-
tiable instrument, the court must rely on the signature. The two common
situations are as follows:
(1) The contract is executed by Roe and the signature reads:
"John Doe
Richard Roe"
In this situation the universal rule is that Roe is personally liable and
that parol evidence is not admissible to show that Roe signed only as the
agent of Doe and that this was understood by the parties.8
(2) The signature reads:
"The X Company
John Doe, President"
'West Hill Colony, Inc. v. Sauerwein, 138 N.E. 2d 403 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956). The
Code specifically provides that in this situation, the wife would be liable on the
building contract where the contract is made by the husband. Otno REv. CObB §
1311.10.
'Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. and W. 834 (Eng. Exchequer, 1841).
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